We examine initial public offerings (IPOs) by foreign firms in the U.S. market between 1990 and 1997, and compare their direct and indirect issue costs to IPOs by U.S. firms. Our results indicate that foreign IPOs involve approximately the same costs on average as domestic IPOs, for all except those experiencing strong demand and upward revisions in the offer price over the course of the road show. For upwardly revised IPOs, foreign IPOs have significantly lower underpricing compared to domestic IPOs. For these offers, we find that lower underpricing is associated with less risk due to the generally greater quality of foreign issuers. It is also the case that these offers are sold more frequently in multiple markets. In addition, we observe lower underpricing for IPOs from emerging markets, which is consistent with demand being driven to some extent by diversification. Overall, we uncover no evidence to suggest that foreign IPOs experience greater capital raising costs than domestic IPOs.
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Introduction
Large numbers of foreign firms have made first offers of equity in the U.S. in recent years. The large volume of cross-border issues raises an important issue of how initial public offers (IPOs) by foreign firms in the U.S. compare to IPOs by U.S. firms both from the firm and investors' point of view. 1 While there has been a growing literature on the impact and consequences of foreign firms' methods of entry into the U.S. market, surprisingly no study has examined the characteristics of foreign firms raising capital for the first time in the U.S and their associated costs of going public.
Foreign firms have been drawn to the U.S. to improve their access to capital, diversify their shareholder base, grow their business operations, and exploit perceived disparities in valuation. (Stulz (1981) , Fanto and Karmel (1998) , Mittoo (1992) , Pagano, et. al (1999) ). Offsetting these benefits, however, are the costs of meeting the strict public disclosure requirements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the potential information costs that foreign firms can bear. Merton (1987) argues that markets can be segmented by information if investors purchase only the securities of firms they know. If foreign firms are less well known to U.S. investors, theory would suggest they face increased capital-raising costs relative to better-known peers.
Much of our existing knowledge of U.S. investors' reaction to foreign firms is based on studies of Depository Receipts issues, which primarily focus on listings of foreign companies on a U.S. exchange (e.g., Miller (1999) , Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Karolyi (1998) for a review)). In these studies, the foreign firm making an American Depository Receipt issue is already listed in its home market. In a number of instances, the foreign firm also raises equity as part of an ADR issue. While these issues are first issues of equity in the U.S., they are seasoned issues relative to the home market. These issues are also not the initial public offerings of these foreign firms, which are the particular focus of this study.
Our foreign issuers are not listed on their home country exchange prior to the IPO and the U.S. IPO is their first public issue of any security in any market. Because the firms are not listed prior to the U.S. IPO, they are without an established investor following in the home market and do not have a trading history to draw on in pricing the U.S. offer. Hence, relative to prior studies, our foreign firms represent pure-plays with respect to U.S. investors' lack of familiarity.
Studies to date have examined the effect of a U.S. listing or a capital-raising event on a foreign firm's stock returns. The evidence suggests that firms experience positive valuation effects as a result of a U.S. listing (Foerster and Karolyi (1999) , Karoyli (1998) , Miller (1999) , and Errunza and Miller (1999) ), and improve their access to capital (Lins, Strickland and Zenner (1999) ). While the focus in previous studies has been to examine the benefits of a U.S. listing with respect to foreign firms' home market opportunities, our purpose is to document the costs of raising capital for foreign firms in comparison to U.S. firms. First time IPOs by foreign firms in the U.S. should be particularly revealing of the costs and benefits of entry into equity markets and as such, the results have important implications for how U.S.
investors value expanding global investment opportunities. Thus, our study addresses relevant but unexamined questions in the literatures on the costs of going public (see Ritter (1987 Ritter ( , 1984 ) and the costs of international capital raising.
Foreign IPOs can experience different issue costs compared to domestic IPOs due to asymmetric information, differences in the underlying quality and risk of the issuers, and the demand for the issues.
In particular, diversification could augment the demand for foreign IPOs and, all else equal, drive U.S.
investors to pay more for a foreign IPO. U.S. investors could increase the value placed on foreign IPOs to the extent their ownership of foreign assets is affected by government imposed investment restrictions ((Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) and Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) ), and they face high transactions costs of purchasing shares on a foreign market.
Relative to domestic IPOs, we find that foreign IPOs are larger firms, which make la rger issues.
Fifty-eight percent of the issues in our sample are from developed countries, the majority of which have cultural or historical links to the U.S. (e.g., Canada, U.K.). Foreign IPOs tend to occur more frequently in industries that are that are associated with 'brick and mortar' investments and are less associated with intangible capital and brand recognition than domestic IPOs. Taken together, these characteristics appear to lessen the risk of foreign IPOs and reduce the potential for them to be associated with higher capital costs. On the other hand, the greater size of foreign issuers does not necessarily lead to greater investor following. In general, neither domestic nor foreign IPOs possess any significant analyst coverage at the time of the IPO and it takes twice as long for comparable analyst coverage to materialize for foreign IPOs.
We find no evidence to suggest that foreign IPOs experience greater costs relative to domestic IPOs. Univariate comparisons of costs suggest that foreign IPOs experience lower direct and indirect costs relative to domestic IPOs. Gross spreads and underpricing are lower on average for the entire sample of foreign IPOs when compared to domestic IPOs matched by industry, asset, and issue size.
When conditioned on price revisions relative to the expected offer price, we find an interesting departure. For offers with downward or no revision in the offer price relative to the expected price, there is no difference in underpricing across domestic and foreign IPOs. But foreign issuers whose price is revised upward experience lower underpricing costs than their domestic peers. Compared to 15 percent for foreign IPOs, upwardly revised domestic IPOs experience underpricing of 26 percent, in line with the two times average underpricing reported in Hanley (1993) . Regression analysis confirms our main finding that foreign IPOs end up issuing at approximately the same costs on average as domestic IPOs, for all but the upwardly revised offers which experience considerably more favorable pricing. Hence, a large body of evidence points to a similar conclusion-foreign firms do not experience higher costs of raising capital.
Upwardly revised foreign offers experience lower underpricing, which raises the question of whether these issues possess special characteristics and terms that result in lower indirect costs than domestic IPOs. We compare upwardly revised foreign and domestic issuers and find, consistent with the overall results, that foreign IPOs are larger firms, listed more frequently on the NYSE, in relatively low-risk businesses. A significantly greater proportion of upwardly revised foreign IPOs are simultaneous offers of equity in the U.S. and other markets. This suggests that the lack of demand in one market can potentially be compensated for in other markets, thereby reducing the underwriting risk associated with the offering. Investment banks desiring to build a reputation for handling foreign IPOs may be keen on maximizing the offer proceeds to the firm, thereby reducing the potential for underpricing (Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Dunbar (2000) ). This is particularly relevant for privatizations where investment banks compete hard for the right to lead the issue and the proceeds raised from the issue are an important consideration (Megginson and Netter (2000) ). Consistent with this, six out of the twelve privatizations in the sample are upwardly revised. Finally, in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , underpricing is the compensation paid to investors for revealing positive information about the offer during the road-show, i.e. "truth-telling." To the extent that foreign IPOs offer greater portfolio diversification benefits relative to domestic IPOs, the compensation for "truth-telling" can be lower. We find that emerging market IPOs have significantly lower underpricing relative to domestic IPOs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample data and presents basic characteristics of the foreign IPOs. Section 3 compares the characteristics, market conditions, and analyst coverage of foreign and domestic IPOs. Section 4 investigates the direct and indirect issue costs of foreign and domestic IPOs. Section 5 gives our conclusions.
The sample of foreign IPOs
We identified through the Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database all foreign firms that made firm commitment initial public offerings in the U.S. between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1997-this yielded 390 observations. Of these, we eliminated financials and utilities, and firms with equity trading in a non-U.S. market prior to the U.S. IPO, which reduced the sample to 293
foreign IPOs.
Our sample of IPOs differs in several important ways from earlier studies of depository receipts issuances. First, the depository receipts issuances in the U.S. used in previous studies (Foerster and Karoyli (1999), Miller (1999) ) involve the cross listing of shares from other global exchanges. These firms have equity trading on another exchange (usually their home market) and thus are seasoned firms with some investor following already established. By comparison, our offers are first time issues in any market. Second, all of the offers in our sample involve capital raising and therefore a higher level of public disclosure. As such, they are Level-III depository receipts issuances that subject the foreign firm to the listing requirements of the applicable U.S. exchange and to the public disclosure requirements and regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Hence, our sample excludes Level-I depository receipts issuances that do not require listing and Rule 144A offerings that allow the firm to raise capital from institutional investors without having to list or meet SEC disclosure requirements. This affords insights into foreign IPOs under more uniform conditions of transparency. Table I reports the number of foreign IPOs occurring over the sample years. Foreign IPOs grew over the sample period from a low of no offers in 1990 to a high of 73 offers in 1997. The number and volume of issuance grew steadily through 1994 and then declined slightly in 1995, following the Mexican Peso crisis in December 1994. In total, foreign firms raised some $30 billion in the U.S. equity markets since 1990. Almost half of the total was raised in the final two sample years. Consequently, the data suggest that cross-border IPOs are an important and growing source of capital for non-U.S. firms.
The bottom portion of Table I gives the number of IPOs by country of origin, country risk rating for the year of the first foreign IPO, and the month and year of the first IPO originating from that country.
Issuers come from 40 different countries, which broadly break down into 22 emerging market countries and 18 developed countries. 2 The countries with the largest number of IPOs are Israel (50), Canada (35), 2 We use the country risk ratings published in the annual survey by Euromoney to determine emerging versus developed market status. Rating levels below 86 are used as the cut-off for emerging markets. For comparative purposes, the Euromoney country risk rating for the U.S. ranges from 97.2 to 99.5 over the sample period. In Table  I , the ratings correspond to the year of the first issue from that country. In the subsequent regression analysis, the country risk rating is updated to correspond to the date of each foreign IPO. Our definition permits countries that are classified as emerging at one point in the sample to be classified as developed at another point. Figure 1 , in which we plot the total volume of equity raised from emerging and developed countries by year. In only one year, 1993, does the volume of equity raised by emerging market issuers exceed that of developed market issuers. Otherwise, over the course of the sample period the bulk of foreign IPOs (measured by value) arise from developed market countries.
Among the countries with the largest number of IPOs, two share a common border with the U.S.
(Canada, Mexico), and three a common language with the U.S. (Canada, Hong Kong, United Kingdom.)
These traits are likely to reduce the risk that U.S. investors perceive to be associated with foreign IPOs.
In Figure 2 , we further depict the range and heterogeneity of risks associated with the sample of foreign issuers. For this chart, we total the volume of issues for country risk rating categories. 3 As can be seen from the figure, a bi-modal effect is observed in which the largest dollar-volume of issues comes from very high rated developed countries. But there is also a sizeable volume of issues from extremely low rated emerging countries. Consequently, foreign IPOs encompass a broad range of risk factors with which U.S. investors must contend.
In Table II in all subsequent analysis. We obtain from the SDC New Issues database, using the criteria described earlier, a sample of 2,689 domestic IPOs by industrial firms with complete data over the period from 1991 to 1997.
In Table III , foreign firms have average assets of $761 million, and median assets of $53 million.
The average and median issue sizes are respectively $213 million and $63 million. The large discrepancy between the mean and median reflects the skewness caused by some very large firms and issues in the sample. 4 The average domestic IPO has assets of $137 million and raises $50 million in equity capital.
Hence, both firm size and issue size are significantly greater for foreign IPOs. Baker, et. al (1999) suggest that greater visibility is afforded by listing on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) relative to other U.S. exchanges. We examine the proportion of firms listing on the NYSE and find that 31 percent of the foreign IPOs list on the NYSE compared to only 11 percent of domestic IPOs, a difference that is statistically significant. The greater incidence of NYSE listings among foreign IPOs however is not due to greater size owing to the age of the firms. The average age of domestic IPOs is 8.1 years relative to 8.8
years for foreign IPOs, a difference that is not significant.
5
Fifty-eight percent of foreign IPOs are simultaneous offers in the U.S. and at least two other markets compared to 12 percent of domestic IPOs, a significant difference. To be classified as a simultaneous offer, a foreign IPO must be offered for sale in the U.S., its local market, and one other market (typically Europe.) A domestic IPO is considered a simultaneous offer if it is offered in one market in addition to the U.S. market. For the simultaneous offers, the U.S. market accounts for 78 percent of the target market for foreign offers suggesting that despite being offered in multiple markets, by far the biggest tranche is sold in the U.S. The prevalence of simultaneous offers is consistent with the greater size of foreign IPOs and a desire on underwriters' part to reduce underwriting risk. Nonetheless, foreign issuers have substantially higher amounts targeted for sale in the U.S. or what constitutes their foreign market than U.S. firms issuing seasoned equity abroad, which typically target only 20 percent of the issue for non-U.S. markets (Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2000) ).
Market conditions
Market conditions surrounding the announcement of the capital-raising event can also affect investor demand and the costs of issue. For example, the literature on seasoned equity issues typically shows that issuance follows strong performance of the broader equity markets (see, among others, Asquith and Mullins (1986) , Masulis and Korwar (1986) , Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , Korajczyk, Lucas and MacDonald, (1990) ). Cross border issues, however, may not follow this pattern. For instance, international portfolio diversification arguments can support a scenario in which foreign firms are more likely to issue under relatively weak U.S. market conditions and relatively strong home market performance. Also, a weakening of the home currency vis-à-vis the dollar can, by reducing the dollar cost of investment, increase U.S. demand for the foreign shares. 5 The age of the firm could be obtained for only 51 foreign firms and 783 domestic firms
In Table III , we report the performance of the home market, U.S. market, and currency prior to the announcement of the issue in the U.S. market. To assess home market conditions at the time of the U.S. IPO, we collect the local equity market and currency returns for each IPO from Datastream, Inc.
The home market runup, HMKT(-60, -2), is the cumulative return from day -60 to day -2 for the issuer's home country index relative to the announcement date in the U.S. (day 0). U.S. market conditions are measured two ways: USMKT(-60, -2), is the cumulative return for the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period, and S&P500/CPI is the inflation-adjusted level of the Standard and Poors' 500 Stock
Index. 6 The latter variable is motivated by Loughran, Ritter, and Rydquist (1994) 's finding that IPO volume is correlated with the level of stock market valuation. Foreign IPOs typically occur after a 4.8 percent increase in the issuer's home market index and after the U.S. market has risen 4.6 percent in the 60 days prior to issue (relative to a 4.5 percent increase in the U.S. market prior to U.S. IPOs).
Consequently, the results suggest that U.S. IPO issuance follows relatively strong performance in the local and U.S. markets. Foreign and domestic issuers make IPOs at similar inflation-adjusted levels of the S&P500. CURR(-60,-2) refers to the percentage change in the exchange rate defined in units of the foreign currency per U.S. dollar over the 60 days prior to issue. Positive values of CURR(-60,-2) imply a strengthening of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the home country's exchange rate. In general, the U.S. dollar has weakened, but only slightly, relative to the issuer's currency in the 60 days prior to issue.
Within the sample of foreign issues, several other factors are likely to affect the risks or familiarity a U.S. investor associates with a particular issue. These include whether the transaction is from a developed or emerging market country, whether the transaction entails a privatization of a stateowned enterprise, and whether the issuer has connections with a U.S. firm or investor. Foreign IPOs by firms from emerging markets account for 42 percent (N=89) of the sample while the remaining 58 percent come from developed markets. While emerging market firms could be less known to investors ex ante, the median firm and issue sizes are approximately the same for developed and emerging issues. The median firm and issue size are respectively $68 million and $42 million for emerging market firms versus $48 million and $49 million for developed markets firms.
Privatizations of state-owned enterprises tend to be large, attention-grabbing transactions (Megginson and Netter (2000) , Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994) ). Six percent of the sample, or 12 IPOs, involve privatizations. Consistent with a hypothesis of greater notoriety, they have seven times the assets and almost four times the issue size on average of non-privatizations.
Finally, all else equal, it is possible that firms with U.S. connections are better known to U.S.
investors, or that such connections can serve as a signal of quality. We search Dow-Jones News Retrieval
Service to determine if a foreign firm has a product, licensing or franchising relationship, or equity interest with a U.S. based company. We find that 16 percent of the foreign IPOs have a connection to a U.S. firm or a prominent U.S. investor. For example, Coca-Cola FEMSA is the franchise distributor for a U.S.-based firm, Coca Cola. In other cases, such as Colt Telecom Group, a well-known U.S. money manager, Fidelity Management Company, is a major stockholder. There are no significant differences in the assets or issue sizes on average for issuers with and without U.S. connections. The small number of privatizations and issues with U.S. connections suggests that these factors are not an overriding influence on the awareness of foreign IPOs by U.S. investors.
We also compare but do not report the industry distributions of the foreign and domestic IPOs. A chi-square test of homogeneity rejects at the one percent level the null hypothesis that the distributions of the foreign and domestic IPOs are the same. Relative to domestic IPOs, foreign IPOs occur significantly more often in telecommunications, and oil and gas, and significantly less often in services, and retail.
Since the privatizations occur primarily in telecommunications and oil and gas, we eliminate them from the foreign IPOs and re-compute the chi-square test. The results in this case are unchanged. Closer inspection of the businesses included in the broader industry classifications reveals that foreign IPOs are more frequently associated with investments in established industries (manufacturing, machinery, processing) and known technology (telephone), and are less frequently associated with activities that require a high degree of 'intangible' capital or brand identity. For example, the service industry contains a large number of software companies. Forty-five percent of domestic IPOs from the service industry are software firms, whereas only 11 percent of foreign IPOs are software firms. Consequently, as a group, the value of foreign IPOs appears to derive more from 'assets-in-place' than domestic IPOs (Myers (1977) ). 
Analyst coverage
Although foreign firms tend to be larger firms, additional risk can arise from a lack of information about these firms. Previous studies use analyst coverage to measure the extent of information available to the market and investors. Hence, in All of these differences in analyst coverage are statistically significant. The lower post-issue institutional following for foreign issuers is consistent with Merton's (1987) view that certain issuers may be 'neglected.' 7 The industry distribution of foreign IPOs is consistent with the results in Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998) . The findings in these papers suggest strong differences in the distribution of industries across countries. Cross-country diversification benefits are attributed to differences in industry composition across countries. 8 Brennan and Subrahmanymam (1995) and Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) find that greater analyst coverage is associated with a reduction in adverse selection costs thereby increasing the depth of the market. Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (1999) report an increase in analyst and media coverage when foreign firms cross-list on the New York Stock Exchange. 9 Nine percent of foreign IPOs have analyst coverage one month after the IPO versus 21 percent of domestic IPOs over the same period.
The evidence in Table III suggests that on some outward dimensions foreign IPOs have characteristics generally consistent with higher quality or lower risk, such as larger size and a greater frequency of NYSE listings. Foreign issuers, however, have no analyst coverage at the time of the IPO and it takes almost twice the time for them to achieve comparable coverage following the IPO. These results suggest that institutional following is slower to evolve for foreign IPOs. One reason for this may be that the analysts themselves are generally less familiar with foreign firms. 10 What is unclear from these findings, however, is the degree to which these characteristics affect the costs of issue.
Direct and indirect issue costs
In Table IV we examine the direct and indirect costs of equity issuance. Direct issue costs are measured by the gross spread, which is the sum of the management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession as a percentage of the amount offered. Indirect costs are measured by initial returns or underpricing. Day n initial return (IR) is the day n close price divided by the offer price minus one.
Because Table III highlighted the differences in size and industry, we create matched samples with an equal number of foreign and U.S. IPOs to control for industry, asset size, and issue size.
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In Table IV , underpricing is significantly lower on average for the foreign IPOs relative to the full sample and matched samples of domestic IPOs. This is evident in the significantly lower initial returns (IR) measured over one day, and thirty days after the offering. The average gross spread of 6.49 percent 10 Other reasons might include the fact that analysts often choose to follow stocks based on the potential for their analysis to 'add value' for investors. The greater volatility of some foreign markets may make the value added more difficult to discern. Fundamental analysis may be less important to investors if they hold foreign stocks primarily for diversification purposes. 11 The industry matched control sample is constructed as follows. For each of the foreign IPOs we identify a domestic IPO offered within one month of the foreign IPO offer date. From these firms, we choose a domestic issuer that matches the three digit SIC code of the foreign issuer. If more than one match is available, we choose the U.S. firm that is closest in asset size to the foreign firm. In only two cases is there more than one industry match. For the issue size and assets size control samples, we repeat step 1 and then choose the domestic firm that is closest in issue (or asset) size to the foreign issuer.
for the foreign IPOs is significantly below the average gross spread for the full sample of domestic issues, which is in close proximity to the 'seven-percent solution' reported in Chen and Ritter (1999) .
12 13
Theoretical models such as Rock (1986) often use underpricing as an indicator of the ex ante uncertainty or the lack of familiarity about an issue and similar arguments apply to gross spread. Contrary to the notion that foreign firms are ex ante less familiar, both the mean and median costs are significantly lower on average for foreign IPOs.
Role of demand
Issue costs, in particular underpricing, are also a reflection of the demand for an IPO. In Table V, we investigate the role of investors' demand for IPOs using two proxies from prior studies. Ritter (1984) generally 17 The overall results suggest that the lower underpricing for foreign 14 These results are unchanged if we classify the high and low volume periods based on more extreme criteria, such as the top and bottom 25 percent months. 15 On average there are 66 days between the filing date and offer date for a foreign IPO versus 78 days for a domestic IPO. The difference is not significant. 16 We obtain similar results if revisions are measured relative to the high and low price in the preliminary file range rather than to mid-point of the file range. For instance, the offer price exceeds the high price in the file range for 25 percent of foreign IPOs and 22 percent of domestic offers. For these offers, underpricing is 32 percent for domestic offers and 18 percent for foreign offers, a significant difference. 17 We retain for the match sample analysis the domestic offers that were determined previously to be 'best matches' based on time, industry and size that also have upward and downward revisions, as the case may be. This procedure ensures the greatest control for the underlying quality differences between the offers.
IPOs in Table IV is confined to upwardly revised offers. Otherwise, there are no significant differences in underpricing between the two groups. 
Regression analysis
We turn to regression analysis of investor returns to assess the relative importance of the foreign status of the issuer, size, demand conditions, and other possible influences on the results.
First day initial returns
In Table VII we report pooled cross-sectional regressions of the foreign and U.S. IPOs where the dependent variable is the first day initial return. We report results for the asset-size matched sample only, although similar results are obtained for the full sample, industry and issue size matched samples. 19 The independent variables attempt to control for firm specific factors, market conditions, and other factors associated with familiarity. A dummy variable "Foreign" is equal to one if the issue is a foreign IPO and is zero for a U.S. IPO. With the other control variables in the regression, the coefficient of the foreign dummy captures the relative cost differences between U.S. and foreign issuers. Columns (1) and (2) in Table VII present specifications that control for firm and issue characteristics but exclude variables related to demand conditions. In column (1), the coefficient of the foreign dummy is negative and significant suggesting that foreign issues experience less underpricing on average relative to domestic IPOs. Firm size is significantly negatively related to underpricing, which is consistent with larger firms having lower risk. The results also reflect that more favorable U.S. market conditions are associated with higher levels of underpricing: the U.S. market runup is positively and significantly associated with initial returns. If USMKT(-60,-2) is replaced by S&P500/CPI, similar results obtain (not reported). 18 We also compared underpricing across simultaneous and non-simultaneous offers. The lower underpricing for foreign IPOs is robust to this comparison in the overall and matched sub-samples. In particular, for simultaneous offers, Day 1 IR averages 8.42 percent for foreign compared to 12.60 percent for domestic offers, and for nonsimultaneous offers is 11.67 percent for foreign and 15.51 percent for domestic offers. 19 We are cognizant of the fact that a matched sample regression can result in biased t statistics due to over-sampling of the same observation. Our results, however, for the full sample are similar to those reported for the matched samples, thereby reducing this concern.
In column (2), we add dummy variables for emerging market firms, privatizations and for firms with U.S. connections. Given the generally greater size of privatizations, these dummy variables induce some collinearity with the foreign dummy and, as a result, reduce its significance; but the coefficient for the foreign dummy variable remains negative.
In column (3), we include the variables measuring demand. The "Offer Price > Expected Price" dummy is equal to one if the IPO offer price exceeds the expected offer price, and is zero otherwise. The "High Volume" dummy variable is one for issues that are offered in high volume (above median) months, and is zero otherwise. When demand conditions are held constant, the foreign dummy is not significant.
The "Offer Price > Expected Price" dummy is positive and significant indicating that underpricing is significantly higher under conditions of greater than anticipated demand. This result is consistent with Hanley's (1993) finding that a higher degree of underpricing is associated with upwardly revised offers.
When we interact upward revisions with the Foreign dummy, the coefficient is negative (-0.102) and significant (t-statistic=-2.48). The coefficients in column (3) imply that for a one percent increase in the offer price to expected price ratio, domestic IPOs experience an increase in first day underpricing of 20.6 percent compared to foreign IPOs that experience a 10.4 percent (0.206-0.102) increase relative to offers that are not revised upward. We find qualitatively identical results in column (4), where we exclude all privatizations from the sample. One drawback of the pooled regressions in Table VII is that it forces the coefficients on the control variables to be the same. This may cause estimation problems in light of the large differences in the control variables between the foreign and domestic IPOs. Therefore, we estimate (not reported) the third specification in Table VII separately for the foreign and domestic IPO samples.
We then use the coefficient estimates and the average values of the independent variables to predict first day underpricing. The results show that domestic IPOs are associated with 14.3 percent underpricing versus 10.1 percent for foreign IPOs. Hence the results are consistent with the pooled regression results.
The regression results confirm the univariate results in Table VI that the lower underpricing associated with foreign IPOs derives from the subset of upwardly revised offers. In the first specification where the demand variables are excluded but other factors such as firm size and issue size are held constant, the foreign dummy is negative and significant. However, when the demand variables are included, the foreign dummy is insignificant and the difference is captured by the significant negative coefficient on the interaction term for foreign IPOs and upwardly revised offers. These results indicate that, but for upwardly revised offers, there are no significant differences in underpricing between foreign and domestic IPOs. For upwardly revised offers, however, foreign IPOs experience significantly less underpricing.
Additional sensitivity analysis
Since the late 1980s, there has been a gradual relaxation of restrictions on U.S. investors holding foreign assets. 20 Consequently, it seems reasonable that diversification might have more influence on demand for early issues from an emerging market country than later issues. Hence, we also examine the underpricing associated with first issues from emerging market countries. First issues average 9.0 percent (median=5.2 percent) underpricing compared to 15.2 percent (median= 8.0 percent) underpricing reported in Table IV univariate results for domestic IPOs. The results support the claim that diversification increases the demand for these issues but the difference is not significant. Possibly this is due to the fact there are only ten first time issues from emerging countries. If we include a dummy in the regressions for a first time issue from an emerging market country, it is not significant.
Prior studies find that underpricing is also linked to underwriter reputation, although the direction of the effect is mixed. Hanley (1993) finds that underpricing is negatively related to the underwriter's relative market share of IPOs, whereas Beatty and Welch (1996) find that for IPOs in the 1990s, underpricing is positively related to underwriter reputation. We measure underwriter reputation using the market share measure developed in Megginson and Weiss (1991) . Market share is estimated as the total volume of IPOs brought to market by a particular underwriter relative to the total volume of IPOs for the period 1991-1997. The average underwriter market share for all domestic IPOs, 3.2 percent, is significantly smaller than that for foreign IPOs, 6.2 percent. This finding indicates that higher reputation investment banks typically handle foreign IPOs. However, the reputation variable is not a significant influence on underpricing in our matched sample regressions (for brevity these results are not report in detail).
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Firms from the Caribbean (Bermuda, Bahamas, Cayman, British Virgin Islands, Netherlands
Antilles) represent about six percent of our sample and could be considered domestic (U.S.) firms that are domiciled abroad for tax reasons. We repeat our analysis without these firms and find qualitatively identical results. The Day 1 IR averages 10.04 percent (median = 3.47 percent) for this sample while the gross spread averages 6.48 percent (median= 7.00 median). Loughran and Ritter (1999) use prospect theory to explain why in the case of upwardly revised offers, issuers may be more accepting of underpricing. Assuming that most IPOs entail the sale of primary shares, the increase in price after the offer (underpricing) increases the wealth of the issuer (i.e., an insider) by more than the opportunity cost of "leaving money on the table," thereby increasing the net wealth of the insider. An implication of this theory is that underpricing will be tolerated and hence be larger as the proportion of primary shares increases. All else equal, an implication of prospect theory would be that the larger underpricing experienced by domestic offers could be due to a larger percentage of primary shares associated with these offers. The univariate comparisons in Table III show that domestic IPOs have a significantly higher proportion of primary shares (97 percent) relative to foreign IPOs (86 percent). When this variable is included in the regression however, it is not significant and more importantly does not change the sign or significance of the upward revision dummy. Hence, the lower underpricing of foreign IPOs is not attributable to the fact that they have a smaller component of primary shares.
Gross spread 21 The coefficient of this variable is positive and hence our results are in line with Beatty and Welch (1996.) With the reputation variable included, all control samples show the upward revision dummy is significant.
We also conduct (but do not report) regression analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of gross spread. These regressions show, all else equal, that the coefficient of the foreign dummy is not significant indicating that the direct costs of foreign IPOs do not differ on average from those of domestic IPOs. Like prior studies by Booth and Smith (1986) , and Lee, et. al (1996) , asset and issue size are significantly negatively correlated to gross spread which is consistent with larger size being associated with lower underwriting risk. Simultaneous offers are also associated with lower direct costs, presumably due to the spreading of risk across multiple markets. Interestingly, emerging market firms, which might be expected to have higher risk, face significantly lower issue costs. Some of this finding appears to be due to the overlap between issuers from emerging markets and privatizations. Given government objectives to maximize proceeds (Megginson and Netter (2000) , Megginson, et. al (1994) ), underwriters in privatizations tend to be selected based on spread pricing. Consistent with this, we find that the average gross spread is 4.4 percent for privatizations, well below the 6.5 percent average for all foreign
IPOs. Another explanation is that privatizations and emerging market issues are loss leaders to investment banks seeking to build reputation handling global IPOs. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the foreign dummy is insignificant for regressions estimated with and without privatizations.
Overall, the results indicate that foreign firms end up issuing at approximately the same costs on average as domestic IPOs, for all but the upwardly revised offers. For upwardly revised IPOs, foreign
IPOs experience significantly lower underpricing, which is a major component of the costs of going public. Since upwardly revised foreign offers appear to be more favorably priced relative to domestic IPOs, we examine the characteristics, terms, and market conditions of these issues to see if they can shed further light on why these issues are underpriced less.
The determinants of upwardly revised foreign and domestic IPOs
In The results in Table VIII also show that more of foreign IPOs undergoing upward revision are listed on the NYSE, which again suggests higher quality. These features of foreign issuers could signify lower risk that allows the banks to revise the offer price upward more substantially. In line with the quality argument, the "Offer Price to Expected Price" ratio shows that the pre-offer price is raised 21 percent from the mid-point of the file range for foreign IPOs versus 16 percent for the full sample of domestic IPOs, a significant difference.
We also examine the industry composition of the upwardly revised sub-sample of offers (not reported). As in the case of the overall sample, a chi-squared test rejects the hypothesis that the industry distribution of the two groups is equal. We find significantly larger proportions of foreign IPOs in mining, chemicals, and telecommunications and smaller proportions in retail and services compared to domestic IPOs. Consistent with the overall sample, this suggests that upwardly revised foreign IPOs also reflect evidence of less intangible capital relative to the domestic IPOs.
Multiple markets
Another possible reason for lower underpricing is the prevalence of multiple market offers among the foreign IPOs. If the offer price is set too high, the opportunity to move unsold shares to other markets provides the investment banker with an additional outlet to reduce underwriting risk relative to domestic IPOs. Table VIII shows that a significantly larger proportion of foreign IPOs (69 percent) involves a simultaneous issue of shares in the U.S. market and other markets relative to domestic IPOs (15 percent).
In addition, the proportion of simultaneous offers for foreign IPOs in this sub-sample is higher than that for the entire sample of foreign IPOs (58 percent).
Diversification benefits Benveniste and Spindt (1989) show that when shares in the IPO are rationed, investment bankers compensate investors for truthfully revealing positive information about the offer by underpricing. A prediction of their model is that upwardly revised issues also result in larger underpricing. If investment in foreign IPOs is primarily driven by diversification motives, the relative compensation for truth-telling could be lower. We find that underpricing averages 11.94 percent for emerging market IPOs that are upwardly revised compared to 17.39 percent for IPOs from developed markets, both of which are significantly lower than the average underpricing for domestic IPOs (25.13 percent) that are upwardly revised.
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Investment banks may be more intent on developing a reputation for handling global IPOs; and large underpricing may be seen as an impediment to that effort (see Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Dunbar (2000)). This could be more important for privatizations that often have maximizing proceeds as an important objective of the offering. Of the twelve privatizations, seven are from emerging markets. Six out of the twelve privatizations in the sample are upwardly revised. Of the six, four are from emerging markets. When we exclude privatizations, the differences in underpricing persist across domestic and foreign upwardly revised offers. The average underpricing remains 15 percent for foreign offers and the difference in underpricing with the domestic IPOs remains significant at the one percent level.
Prospect theory
Lower underpricing of foreign IPOs may be driven by the fact that a smaller proportion of these offers involve primary shares compared to domestic offers. To the extent that underpricing is viewed as less of a cost when primary shares are offered, domestic offers with more primary shares could be associated with greater underpric ing. In Table VIII , the difference in the proportion of primary shares across foreign IPOs and domestic IPOs is greater (84 percent versus 97 percent) than in the overall sample (86 percent versus 97 percent), but the effect is small.
In Table IX , we further examine the underpricing of the upwardly revised foreign IPOs.
Upwardly revised foreign IPOs are broken into two groups based on the median level of underpricing. As is apparent from the results, low levels of underpricing are associated with larger offers, a higher proportion of simultaneous offer, and a higher proportion of NYSE listed offers. All of these speak to the greater quality of these issues. In addition, the results also show that foreign IPOs with lower underpricing come more frequently from emerging markets. Consistent with this, a smaller percentage of first time issues from emerging market countries experience high underpricing (5 percent versus 11 percent). Both results suggest that diversification augments the demand for these IPOs. We have conjectured that the presence of these factors may allow investment bankers to adjust the offer price higher in the face of strong demand. Consistent with this, we find that offers with low underpricing have higher offer to expected price ratios (1.26) than those with high underpricing (1.16). The results in Table   IX within the foreign IPO group reinforce the findings from Table VIII that firm quality, diversification motives for emerging market firms, and issuance in multiple markets are associated with lower underpricing and larger upward price revisions. Hence, no single factor-but instead many factors work to reduce the capital raising costs of foreign firms.
Conclusions
We find that foreign firms that come to the U.S. to raise capital are well-established firms, sizable, and who experience similar costs of going public to those of domestic U.S. firms. The similarity in issue cost is robust to variations in size, developed or emerging country of origin, whether the issue was offered in multiple markets, and other issuer attributes. One sub-group of foreign IPOs, those with upward price revisions, shows significantly lower indirect costs of issue than comparable domestic IPOs.
Hence, this group receives considerably more favorable pricing than their U.S. counterparts.
The findings are somewhat surprising in light of the existing literatures on cross-border financing and investing. First, there appears to be no premium return for cross-border investing through IPOs, even though most of the issuers in this sample are domiciled in countries riskier than the U.S.
Diversification may provide some explanation for the lack of premium. Although the majority of foreign IPOs come from developed countries, the cross-correlations with the U.S. market are not perfect and thus the benefits of portfolio diversification could offset some degree of higher firm and country risk. Further, foreign IPOs from emerging markets, where the diversification motives are likely to be greatest, have lower levels of underpricing. More research is warranted to explore how diversification affects the pricing of foreign IPOs.
From an information theory perspective, the results do not suggest that foreign IPOs incur costs from being less well-known or "neglected" in the sense of Merton (1987) . However, one reason that foreign firms may not appear unfamiliar to U.S. investors is that the firms that come to America for an IPO show higher quality on certain dimensions such as size and the visibility of exchange listing. They are more likely to be marketed in several markets, which is also suggestive of greater visibility. And they tend to represent 'old economy' businesses with fewer intangible assets than domestic IPOs.
Entry by foreign firms into the U.S. equity markets foreshadows growing global capital market integration. In a frictionless world, easy entry would result in a wide diversity of issuers on many dimensions such as size and risk. But in a world of capital market friction, induced for instance by information asymmetries on the investor's side and the reluctance to meet stringent disclosure requirements on the issuers side, only those firms make it that are able to overcome these restrictions.
Our findings above are consistent not with a hypothesis of frictionless entry, but with a hypothesis of selective entry, that the American equity market admits issuers it knows, and whose securities it wants.
To a large extent these findings suggest that "only the best come here" and this more than compensates for the fact that foreign firms are less known. If the latter is true, there is a selection bias in the type of firms coming to the U.S. Such a result is consistent with Kim and Stulz (1988) and Marr, Trimble, and Varma (1991) 's findings that off-shore issuers are high quality firms. Therefore, our finding of equivalent issue costs for foreign IPOs should not be construed to imply that foreign firms bear no costs from being unknown. 
Table III Selected characteristics of foreign IPOs
The first row is the mean value and the second row is the median. USMKT(-60,-2) is the percentage price change in the CRSP value weighted index for a 60 day period prior to the announcement date of the offer; S&P500/CPI is the inflation adjusted level of the Standard and Poors' 500 Stock Index, HMKT(-60,-2) is the percentage price change in the index of the home market for a 60 day period prior to the announcement date of the offer; and CURR (-60,-2 The dependent variable is the first day initial return (IR). Measured from the offering price to the closing price on the first day of trading. "Foreign dummy" equals one for foreign IPOs and zero for U.S. IPOs. "Asset size" is the logarithm of the firm's assets measured in millions of U.S. dollars. "Issue size" is the logarithm of offer size in millions of U.S. dollars. "U.S. market runup" is the cumulative return of the CRSP value-weighted index starting 60 days prior to the offer and ending two days prior to the offer. Zero-one dichotomous variables are assigned as follows. "Simultaneous offer" is a dummy variable equal to one if the offer is sold in the U.S. and one or more foreign markets. "Emerging market dummy " is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm is from a country with Euromoney country risk rating < 86. "Privatization dummy" equals one if the issue is a privatization. "U.S. connections dummy" equals one if the firm has a U.S. connection. "Offer Price > Expected Price dummy" equals one if the offer price exceeds the expected price defined as mid-point of the file price range. "Offer Price > Expected Price x Foreign Dummy" is an interactive term. "High volume dummy" equals one if the issue is offered in a month with high volume (i.e., those where the ratio of monthly to total volume is greater than the median monthly to total volume ratio). "High Volume x Foreign Dummy" is an interactive term. Heteroscedasticity consistent T-statistics are in parentheses. Day 1 IR is the initial return to investors measured from the offering price to the price at the close of trading on the first day. In the ratio, "Offer Price to Expected Price," the expected price is the median of the pre-offering price range shown in the securities filing. "Average age" equals the number of years since incorporation of the firm, measured from date of incorporation and/or privatization. 
